COMMENT
THE FIRST AMENDMENT NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE:

FROM BRANZBURG TO FARBER
The issue of whether a newsman may withhold confidential information has generated much controversy in recent years.' While it
has arisen in several contexts, the asserted privilege of nondisclosure
gained widespread recognition in cases where the government subpoenaed newsmen to testify as to their knowledge of certain criminal
conduct and the activities of militant groups. 2 However, when a
defendant in a criminal proceeding seeks to obtain information which
a newsman refuses to disclose under a claim of privilege, questions of
constitutional dimension are implicated.
This precise situation was presented in In re Farber.3 In that
case, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld criminal and civil
contempt judgments entered against The New York Times Company
(Times) and one of its reporters, Myron Farber [hereinafter referred
to as appellants]. 4 These judgments were the result of appellants'
failure to comply with two subpoenas duces tecum directing them to
produce certain materials 5 that Farber had gathered while working as
an investigative reporter, and which related to the murder trial of Dr.
6
Mario Jascalevich.

1 The controversy surrounding the newsman's privilege is reflected in the number of articles written on the subject. See, e.g., Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for
Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 18 (1969); Murasky, The Journalist's
Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829 (1974); Comment, The Newsman's
Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF.
L. REV. 1198 (1970); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV.
838 (1971); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege After Branzburg: The Case For a Federal Shield
Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 160 (1976); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional
Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
2 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
3 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330, cert. denied sub nom. New York Times Co. v. New Jersey,
439 U.S. 997 (1978).
4 78 N.J. at 281, 394 A.2d at 341.
Id.
I at 263, 394 A.2d at 332. Appellants were directed to produce "all statements, pictures, memoranda, recordings, and notes of interviews of witnesses for the defense and prosecution . . .as well as information delivered to the Bergen County Prosecutor's office ...." Subpoena Duces Tecum to Secure Attendance of Witness at Criminal Proceeding, In re Supreme
Court, No. 8867/78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, filed June 2, 1978). These materials included
information gained by Farber concerning more than one hundred witnesses who were to be
called in the murder trial of Dr. Mario Jascalevich. Petition for Certiorari at 2, New York Times
Co. v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Petition for Certiorari].
' State v. Jascalevich, Indictment No. S-495-76 (June x, 19xx).
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The supreme court decision in Farber resolved several controversial issues concerning the right of a newsman to withhold information relating to a criminal prosecution. These issues arose out of
antithetical constitutional and statutory claims. The appellants contended that the free speech and free press clauses of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution 7 extended a privilege
to newsmen to prevent compelled disclosure of confidential information and the sources thereof. 8 Additionally, appellants asserted that
forced disclosure of confidential information violated New Jersey's
statutory provision for a newsman's privilege-the so-called "shield
law." 9 In opposition to these contentions, Dr. Jascalevich argued
that nondisclosure of the materials claimed to be privileged would
impair his right to a fair trial under the compulsory process clauses 10

7 The first amendment to the United States Constitution reads as follows:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8 78 N.J. at 256-66, 394 A.2d at 333.
9 Id. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335. The New Jersey shield statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21
(West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979), provides in pertinent part:
Subject to Rule 37, a person engaged on, engaged in, connected with, or
employed by news media for the purpose of gathering, procuring, transmitting,
compiling, editing or disseminating news for the general public or on whose behalf
news is so gathered, procured, transmitted, compiled, edited or disseminated has a
privilege to refuse to disclose, in any legal or quasi-legal proceeding or before any
investigative body, including, but not limited to, any court, grand jury, petit jury,
administrative agency, the legislature or legislative committee, or elsewhere.
a. The source, author, means, agency or person from or through whom any
information was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, gathered, transmitted,
compiled, edited, disseminated, or delivered; and
b. Any news or information obtained in the course of pursuing his professional
activities whether or not it is disseminated.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
This statute extends the statutory newsmen's privilege to the entire news media. In its
initial version the New Jersey shield law granted the privilege of non-disclosure only to those
persons "engaged on, connected with, or employed by, a newspaper." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:84A-21 (West 1976) (amended West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979). Additionally, the amended
shield statute, unlike its predecessor, gives newsmen the right to refuse to disclose confidential
information, as well as the right granted by the former statute to withhold the source. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
0 The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
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of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution "' and arti12
cle 1, paragraph 10, of the New Jersey Constitution.
This Comment will examine the constitutional newsman's
privilege in both criminal and civil settings. Particular emphasis will
be placed upon the Farber decision and the resolution of the conflicting first and sixth amendment issues by the New Jersey supreme
court.
The Factual Setting
The criminal and civil contempt judgments entered against
appellants were related to the criminal prosecution of Dr. Mario Jascalevich. 13 Dr. Jascalevich was accused of causing the death of five
persons 14 through the use of the drug curare. Appellant Farber,
while working as an investigative reporter, wrote several articles con15
cerning the multiple deaths which were published by the Times.
These articles were a major factor in renewing the investigation of
Dr. Jascalevich by the state of New Jersey, and in leading ultimately
6
to his prosecution for murder.'
During the course of trial, counsel for Dr. Jascalevich sought to
obtain certain materials alleged to have been in appellants' possession. These materials were believed to be essential to the defense of
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
1' Article 1, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to a speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel in
his defense.
N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 10.
It should be noted that the compulsory process clause of the New Jersey Constitution is
identical to that contained in the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. See id.
and note 10 supra.
12 78 N.J. at 271-72, 394 A.2d. at 336.
1. State v. Jascalevich, Indictment No. S-495-76.
14 Id. Although Dr. Jascalevich was originally accused of the murders of five persons, two of
the charges were subsequently dismissed.
'3 Farber's articles concerning the alleged criminal activities of Dr. Jascalevich first appeared in the New York Times in January of 1976, nearly a decade after the deaths occurred.
Many such articles by Farber were subsequently published therein. See, e.g., The New York
Times, Jan. 12, 1976 at 1, col. 4; Id., Jan. 13, 1976 at 41, col. 1; Id., Jan. 15, 1976 at 37, col. 1.
le 78 N.J. at 264, 394 A.2d at 332. In this regard, Judge Arnold of the New Jersey superior
court, law division stated that Farber "provided . .. information that convinced the prosecutor
to reopen an investigation into some deaths that occurred at Riverdell Hospital." State v. Jascalevich, 158 N.J. Super. 488, 490, 386 A.2d 466, 467 (Law Div. 1978).
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Dr. Jascalevich. 17 Upon application by defense counsel and based
upon his affidavit, Judge Arnold of the Superior Court of New Jersey,
law division, issued a certificate of materiality pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without a
State in Criminal Proceedings. 18
The certificate of materiality was then presented to Justice
Rothwax of the New York supreme court, who ordered appellants to
appear for a hearing to determine the appropriateness of the issuance
of the subpoenas duces tecum requested by the defense counsel. 19 As
a result of this hearing, Justice Rothwax issued an opinion-order requiring appellants to comply with these subpoenas. 2 0 Appellants
thereupon moved in the Superior Court of New Jersey to quash the
subpoenas duces tecum claiming that the materials sought by the defense were privileged against disclosure. 2 1 At a hearing on this issue,
Judge Arnold stated that he would neither hear argument on nor decide upon the merits of appellants' motion until the court had the
17 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 5, at 5.
58 Brief for Appellants, at 5, In re Farber, No. A-4741-77, A-4742-77 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law
Div., filed July 24, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants]. The certificate of materiality
was issued pursuant to the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without a
State in Criminal Proceedings, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-18-21 (West 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Uniform Act].
19 The order requiring appellants to appear for a hearing was issued pursuant to N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAws § 640.10 (McKinney 1971), which is New York's codification of the Uniform Act.
At the hearing, appellants argued against the issuance of an order requiring production of
the materials claiming that: (1) Judge Arnold had insufficient grounds upon which to issue the
certificate of materiality; (2) the defense had not made an adequate showing of the need for and
materiality of the requested materials; and (3) forced disclosure of the documents would impose
an undue hardship on appellants since these documents were privileged against disclosure by
the United States Constitution and the Shield Laws of New Jersey and New York. Brief for
Appellants, supra note 18, at 3-4.
25 Opinion-Order, Superior Court v. Farber, No. 8867/78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. County,
filed June 2, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Opinion-Order]. In his opinion-order, Justice Rothwax
stated that the New Jersey courts would have the task of hearing appellants' constitutional and
statutory claims, noting that "New Jersey courts are bound to allow full faith and credit to the
laws of New York when necessary to protect the statutory entitlements of New York citizens."
Opinion-Order, supra, at 5.
Immediately after receiving the order, appellants appealed to the appellate'division of the
Supreme Court of New York and to a judge of the New York Court of Appeals. However, both
the appellate division and Judge Fuchsberg of the court of appeals decided that the order could
not be appealed under New York law. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 5, at 6.
21 Memorandum In Support of Motion to Quash Subpoenas, State v. Jascalevich, Indictment No. S-495-76 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div., filed June 30, 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum].
In their memorandum, appellants urged that the subpoenas duces tecum should be
quashed because (1) the subpoenas were sweepingly overbroad in light of first amendment considerations; (2) there had been no prior showing of the materiality of the requested documents;
and (3) the materials sought were privileged against forced disclosure.
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opportunity to inspect in camera the materials in appellants' possession. 22 Judge Arnold then issued an order (Order to Produce) denying appellants' motion to quash and directing them to produce the
subpoenaed documents.2 3 He also issued an order to show cause
why appellants should not be held in criminal contempt of the Order
to Produce. 24 The civil contempt proceedings were initiated against
Farber shortly thereafter when Judge Arnold issued an order to show
25
cause why Farber should not be held in contempt in aid of litigant.

22 Oral Opinion, State v. Jascalevich, Indictment No. S-495-76 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div.,
filed June 30, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Oral Opinion]. Appellants argued that prior to ordering in camera inspection of the requested documents, the courts should have made threshold
determinations as to the validity of the subpoenas duces tecum, the materiality of the documents sought, and the propriety of their first amendment and shield law claims. Brief for Appellants, supra note 18, at 6. Rejecting these arguments, Judge Arnold stated that:
The Court is being asked to make a decision in a vacuum....
When the items are produced, this Court will give the applicants a full hearing
as to the materiality of the subpoena, its scope and its contents.
The Court will also decide if the items are barred by the Shield Law and any
other legitimate defense that may be asserted.
Oral Opinion, supra, at 5.
2 Order to Produce, State v. Jascalevich, Indictment No. S-495-76 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law
Div., filed June 30, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Order to Produce]. Appellants moved unsuccessfully for stays of the Order to Produce and for leave to appeal. These motions were denied by
the New Jersey superior court, appellate division on July 3, 1978, and by the New Jersey
supreme court on July 6, 1978. Application was subsequently made to the United States Supreme Court for a stay of the July 6 order denying appellants' motion for a stay of the Order to
Produce. Justices White and Marshall of the United States Supreme Court denied this application in separate opinions dated July 11 and July 12, respectively. Petition for Certiorari, supra
note 5, at 7. See New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1304 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
opinion); New York Times Co. v, Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1301 (1978) (White, J., opinion).
24 The order to show cause was made returnable on July 14, 1978 before Judge Trautwein of
the superior court. Brief for Appellants, supra note 18, at 8. At the criminal contempt hearing,
held the same day, the Times entered a plea of not guilty. Farber, however, did not enter a
plea, based upon his contention that the court lacked jurisdiction over him since he was improperly served with the order to show cause outside the state of New Jersey. Id. at 9. These
arguments prompted Judge Trautwein to (1) direct counsel for Dr. Jascalevich to apply to Judge
Arnold for an order to show cause "in aid of litigants" pursuant to New Jersey Court Rule
1:10-5; (2) issue a bench warrant for Farber's arrest; and (3) order counsel for Dr. Jascalevich to
pursue his available remedies in New York under that state's codification of the Uniform Act.
Transcript of Proceedings, State v. Jascalevich, Indictment No. S-495-76 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law
Div., filed July 14, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Transcript of Proceedings]. In addition to this
procedural question, the Times and Farber asserted the invalidity of the Order to Produce.
Appellants' Memorandum of Law in Response to the Order to Show Cause, State v. Jascalevich,
Indictment No. S-495-76 (N.J. Super. Ct., Law Div., filed June 30, 1978).
Shortly thereafter, Judge Arnold issued a certificate pursuant to the Uniform Act, which
counsel for Dr. Jascalevich presented to the Supreme Court of New York on July 17, 1978. The
certificate "adjudg[ed] [Farber] to be a material witness .. . in possession of material documents ...." Accordingly, the certificate requested Farber's immediate arrest. Id.
' Brief for Appellants, supra note 18, at 10-11. At a hearing before the Supreme Court of
New York on July 18, 1978, counsel for Dr. Jascalevich served an ex parte order issued by
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At the criminal and civil contempt hearings held before Judge
Trautwein, the court found appellants guilty of both charges and imposed punitive 2 6 and coercive 27 penalties. Counsel for appellants,
thereupon, requested stays of the contempt sentences which Judge
Trautwein ultimately denied. 28 Similarly, Farber's request for bail
was also denied 29 and he was taken into custody and jailed. 3 0 A
three-judge panel of the New Jersey superior court, appellate division, stayed the order of the superior court in the criminal contempt
proceeding pending appeal but denied a stay of the civil contempt
order.3 1 Thereafter, the New Jersey supreme court entered orders
denying appellants' motion for a stay of Judge Trautwein's order in
the civil contempt proceeding while granting an interim stay of the
coercive sentence in order to allow appellants to petition the United
32
States Supreme Court for relief.
After issuing temporary stays, Justices White and Marshall of the
United States Supreme Court denied, in separate opinions, appellants' application for a stay pending a determination by the court of

Judge Arnold upon Farber's counsel. The order required Farber to appear before Judge Trautwein to show cause on July 26, 1978 why he should not be held in contempt in aid of litigant.
After this hearing, the Supreme Court of New York ordered Farber to appear immediately
before Judge Arnold. Farber complied with this directive, at which time Judge Arnold amended
his previous order to show cause to require Farber to appear before Judge Trautwein in the
criminal contempt action on July 19, 1978. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 5, at 9. Despite
Farber's contentions that he was immune from service of process in New Jersey under the
terms of the Uniform Act, Judge Arnold nevertheless permitted service upon Farber in the
courtroom. Id. Counsel for Dr. Jascalevich, who was appointed to prosecute the civil contempt
charge against Farber, applied for and received an amended order from Judge Arnold to join
the Times as defendant in the proceeding in aid of litigant. Brief for Appellant, supra note 19,
at 15.
26 The criminal penalty imposed upon the Times was a fine of $100,000 to be paid within
twenty-four hours. Farber received a six month jail sentence and a $1,000 fine, also to be paid
within twenty-four hours. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 5, at 9.
27 The civil penalties imposed upon appellants were coercive in nature; designed to effect
disclosure of the subpoenaed materials. The Times received a fine of "$5,000 per day for every
day that elapses until there is compliance with Judge Arnold's Order." Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 24, at 80. Farber received a fine in the amount of $1,000 and was ordered
incarcerated until he complied with the Order to Produce. Id.
28 Brief for Appellants, supra note 18, at 16. Judge Trautwein consulted with counsel for
Dr. Jascalevich before ruling on appellants' application for stays of the criminal and civil contempt sentences. Although counsel for Dr. Jascalevich objected to the incarceration of Farber,
Judge Trautwein nonetheless denied the application for a stay of the order "in aid of" litigant
based on what the court considered "the urgency of the matter." Transcript of Proceedings,
supra note 24, at 82--83.
29 Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 24, at 83.
30 Brief for Appellants, supra note 18, at 16.
3' Id.
32 Id. at 18.

1979]

COMMENT

the application and pending the filing of a writ of certiorari, or alternatively, pending resolution of the appeals by the courts of New Jer33
sey.
Farber surrendered to the sheriff of Bergen County on August 4,
1978, and remained incarcerated in the Bergen County jail until a
stay issued by the New Jersey supreme court on August 30, 1978,
effectuated his release. 3 4 Subsequently, on September 21, 1978, the

33 New York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1331 (1978) (Marshall, J., opinion); New
York Times Co. v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1317 (1978) (White, J., opinion). Justice White denied
appellants' application for a stay on the basis that he would not vote to grant certiorari and was
"unconvinced that four other justices would do so." 439 U.S. at 1324. Similarly, Justice Marshall denied appellants' reapplication for a stay stating that he could not "conclude in good faith
that at least four Justices would vote to grant a writ of certiorari with the case in its present
posture." 439 U.S. at 1337. Moreover, Justice Marshall noted that appellants' faced great difficulty in their reapplication since a single member of the Supreme Court "will seldom grant an
order that has been denied by another Justice." Id. As a result of these factors Justice Marshall
felt "compelled" to deny the application he would have granted "[w]ere [he] deciding [the] issue
on the merits." Id.
34 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 5, at 12. Between August 4, 1978 and August 30, 1978
when the stay was issued, the Times paid their civil contempt penalty of $5,000 per day to the
state of New Jersey. Id.
In addition to granting a stay of the coercive sentences, the supreme court also scheduled
argument on the criminal and civil contempts for September 5, 1978. Id. at 13.
Prior to the issuance of the stay by the supreme court, Farber filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. After a hearing
held on August 11, 1978 concerning this petition, District Judge Frederick B. Lacey delivered
an oral opinion in which he permitted Farber to withdraw the petition rather than obey his
directive to disclose the location of the manuscript of a book Farber was writing on the Jascalevich case. Farber v. Job, No. 78-1899, slip op. at 257 (D.N.J., filed Aug. 11, 1978). In his
opinion, Judge Lacey questioned the truthfulness of Farber's claim that the sources he sought to
protect were in fact confidential and the information he sought to withhold was unpublished. Id. at
245. He observed that the integrity of Farber's first amendment stance had been eroded by "his
having disclosed all or substantially all of the alleged confidential information and unpublished notes
to his literary agent and publishers." Farber v. Job, No. 78-1899, slip op. at 1(D.N.J., supplement
filed Aug. 14, 1978) (footnote omitted). Moreover, Judge Lacey concluded that Farber had a direct
economic stake in the outcome of the Jascalevich trial since his book would only be saleable if Dr.
Jascalevich were convicted. Id. at 2. As Judge Lacey noted in his opinion, Farber could not find a
publisher for his book prior to the indictment of Dr. Jascalevich. However, after Farber persuaded
the Bergen County Prosecutor to reopen the investigation of the "curare" deaths and the indictment
of Dr. Jascalevich followed, Doubleday & Co. agreed to do the publishing work on Farber's book.
This represented a total change in position for Doubleday, which had previously expressed a lack of
interest in the Farber project. Farber v. Job, No. 78-1899, slip op. at 246 (D. N.J., filed Aug. 11, 1978).
Judge Lacey summarized the financial interests of both Doubleday and Farber by observing that
[i]f Jascalevich is acquitted Doubleday ...[will] have on their hands nothing more
than a reporter's discredited notion that murder was committed.
If, on the other hand, he is convicted then, of course, Farber will come on the
scene as not only the author of the book but the great American hero who
singlehandedly vindicated the deceased.
Id. at 247.

340
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Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the contempt convictions by a
35
five to two vote.
In the majority opinion, authored by Justice Mountain, the court
succinctly disposed of appellants' claims to a first amendment
privilege against forced disclosure of confidential information. 36 Relying on Branzburg v. Hayes, 37 the New Jersey high court stated that
"the Supreme Court of the United States . . . has squarely held that
no such First Amendment right exists." 3 8 Similarly, the court also
rejected appellants' contention that the New Jersey shield law afforded them a privilege of nondisclosure of confidential source material. 3 9 While the court agreed that the purpose of the shield law is

As characterized by Judge Lacey, Farber represented "'asorry spectacle of a reporter who
purported to stand on his reporter's privilege when in fact he was standing on an altar of
greed.'" Id. at 256. Accordingly, Farber was ordered to disclose the location of his manuscript.
However, since non-compliance with this order would have exposed Farber to additional contempt liability, he was permitted to withdraw his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Farber v.
Job, No. 78-1899 (D.N.J., supplement filed Aug. 14, 1978) (order granting dismissal of petition
for writ of habeas corpus).
35 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330.
36 Id. at 259, 265-67, 394 A.2d 330, 333-34. In support of their first amendment claims,
appellants argued that news sources would be less likely to provide newsgatherers with information on "important and sensitive issues" if there exists the possibility that their identities will be
revealed. Id. at 265, 394 A.2d at 333. However, many commentators contend that there is no
factual support for the belief that newsworthy information will be withheld from reporters unless the sources of that information can be assured that their identities will remain secret. See,
e.g., V. Blasi, The Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229, 262-74,
284 (1971). Professor Blasi suggested that rather than drying up the sources of information
altogether, the threat that a newsman will be forced to disclose the sources of his information
"'poison[s] the atmosphere" surrounding effective reporting. Id. at 284. Whether the resultant
effect of the "subpoena threat" is the "drying-up" of confidential sources or a "poisoned atmosphere"surrounding reporting, it should be observed that the threat of forced disclosure of
sources who wish to remain anonymous, infringes, to some extent, upon the newsgathering
process. See id. at 271-73.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that the right to gather news is constitutionally protected by the freedom of the press clause of the first amendment, such a right
has been implicitly recognized. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965). In Zemel, the Supreme
Court held that the Secretary of State's refusal to issue a passport for travel to Cuba did not
abridge a citizen's first amendment right to gather information on the state of affairs in that
country. Id. at 13-18. In reasoning that national security considerations necessitated such a
restriction, the Court implied that newsgathering was not without its first amendment protections when it stated that "[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." Id. at 17 (emphasis added). Cf. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (right to print information constitutionally protected). Thus,
assuming some constitutionally protected right to gather news, the question then becomes
whether this right implies the right to protect confidential news sources. See Note, supra note
1, 80 YALE L.J. at 326-29 (1970).
37 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
38 78 N.J. at 266, 394 A.2d at 333.
39 Id. at 274, 394 A.2d at 337.
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to protect against compelled disclosure of confidential sources and information "to the greatest extent permitted by the Constitution of the
United States and that of the State of New Jersey," 4 0 and "that appellants come fully within the literal language of the enactment," 4 1 the
court nonetheless refused to apply the shield law provision under the
circumstances of this case. Instead, the court was persuaded by respondents' argument that the right of Dr. Jascalevich "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor" 4 2 under the sixth
amendment of the United States Constitution 4 and article 1, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution 44 took precedence over the
45

statute.

4o Id. at 270, 394 A.2d at 335.
41 Id.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 10.
43 The text of the sixth amendment to the Federal Constitution is found at note 10 supra.
44 The text of article 1, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution is found at note 11

supra.
45 78 N.J. at 272, 394 A.2d at 336. This basic constitutional proposition is founded upon
article VI of the United States Constitution which provides, in pertinent part, that
[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in ever'
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Law of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.

The concept of judicial review and its relation to the supremacy clause of the Constitution
was a much debated issue at the state ratifying conventions. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOTS DEBATES 553,
567 (1836). Perhaps the foremost proponent of judicial review, however, was Alexander Hamilton. In No. 78 of the Federalist, Hamilton presented a strong case for the supremacy of a
written constitution when he stated:
There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of
a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is
exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be
valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal;
that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are
superior to the people themselves.
A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law
....
If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the [constitution and a legislative act], that which has the superior obligation and validity ought,
of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute ....
THE FEDERALIST No. 78 at 485 (A. Hamilton).

Additionally, the New Jersey Constitution, which has a compulsory process clause identical
to that of the Federal Constitution, occupies a similar position of supremacy to the New Jersey
shield law. See, e.g., Bvrnes v. Boulevard Commissioners, 16 N.J. Misc. 141, 197 A. 667
(1938), aff'd, 121 N.J.L. 497, 3 A.2d 456 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939). In Byrnes, the court held that
a legislative act which conflicts with the constitution is unenforceable. The court observed that
"[t]he supreme law of the state is its constitution. All statutory law to be valid must conform to
[it]." Id. at 146, 197 A. at 670.
It should be noted, however, that none of the parties in Farber had attacked the facial
constitutionality of the New Jersey shield law. 78 N.J. at 271, 394 A.2d at 336. Indeed, Justice
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However, in an attempt to reconcile the strong legislative intent
favoring a newsman's privilege of nondisclosure with the decision that
the shield law is subordinate to Dr. Jascalevich's constitutional rights,
the court prescribed a set of procedural safeguards to be implemented in similar situations in the future. 4 6 Accordingly, the
court decided that in camera inspection of subpoenaed materials is
not violative of the shield law privilege, but that it is a necessary step
in ascertaining whether, and to what extent, the privilege may be
invoked. 4 7 Notwithstanding this, the court did not blanketly sanction
in camera inspections. Rather, it held that before in camera scrutiny
may be ordered in the future, there must be a preliminary showing of
the materiality and relevance of the requested documents by the de48
fense.
In Farber, though, the court found that the prerequisites of the
preliminary determinations had been sufficiently satisfied by the trial
judge even though they were not formally articulated. Thus, the
court did not find it necessary to remand the case in order for the
trial judge to make formal findings of materiality, need, relevance, and
unavailability. Instead, the New Jersey supreme court concluded
that, based upon the record before the trial judge, those findings
were "abundantly clear." 49
Mountain felt that the shield law, when viewed as an expression of the legislature's intent to
grant the press a broad shield against forced disclosure of confidential material is "entirely
constitutional." Id.
46 78 N.J. at 274-77, 394 A.2d at 337-39.
47 Id. at 275, 394 A.2d at 337-38.
48 Id. at 276-77, 394 A.2d at 338. The court noted, however, that its decision to require a
preliminary determination before allowing in camera inspection was not mandated by first
amendment considerations. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg, the
Supreme Court not only denied the reporters' claim to a first amendment newsman's privilege,
but also strongly rejected their argument that, at the very least, they were entitled to a preliminary hearing prior to going before the grand jury. 408 U.S. at 701-07. Instead, the decision by
the New Jersey supreme court to require such a hearing was based upon what the court termed
its "obligation to give as much effect as possible, within ever-present constitutional limitations,
to the very positively expressed legislative intent to protect the confidentiality and secrecy of
sources from which the media derive information." 78 N.J. at 276, 394 A.2d at 338. Accordingly, the court concluded that in camera inspection would be permissible only after several
preliminary determinations had been made. First, the court must determine whether a reporter
qualified for the shield law protection. Assuming such qualification, disclosure would then be
compelled only where the trial judge assessed the information sought to be material, relevant
and legitimately necessary to the defense, and not available from a "less intrusive source." Id. at
276-77, 394 A.2d at 338.
49 78 N.J. at 277, 394 A.2d at 339. In reaching the decision that the requirements of the
procedural safeguards had already been satisfied, Justice Mountain relied on the record that was
before Judge Arnold when he ordered in camera inspection. Included in this record was knowledge which Judge Arnold had gained during some 18 weeks of trial which had elapsed prior to
the issuance of the Order to Produce. Additionally, the record included certain documents and

1979]

COMMENT

Justices Handler and Pashman filed separate dissenting opinions.
Justice Handler voiced substantial agreement with the court's denial
of appellants' first amendment claims. Furthermore, he agreed that
the privilege bestowed on the press by the New Jersey shield law is a
qualified rather than absolute one, which must yield to superior constitutional rights in certain circumstances. 5 0 Despite this, Justice
Handler was compelled to dissent. Based upon his perception of the
intent of the shield law to provide the broadest possible newsman's
privilege and the stringent standards which ought to be applied when
in camera inspection is sought, Justice Handler concluded that the
judgments of contempt were not justified by the record.51
Justice Pashman dissented on the ground that appellants were
denied due process of law when they were not allowed to contest the
legality of in camera inspection at a hearing prior to such inspection. 52 Arguing that such a failure to provide an opportunity to be
heard made a "mockery" of due process, Justice Pashman concluded
that the contempt judgments should have been vacated. 53 In constatements made by material witnesses which were in the possession of Farber and to which the
defense had been denied access. See id. at 277-81, 394 A.2d at 339-41. It was particularly
important for defense counsel to obtain the statements made by these material witnesses to
Farber since without them, he would not be able to compare their trial testimony with previous
statements made by them. Id. at 281, 394 A.2d at 341 (Hughes, C.J., concurring).
50 Id. at 295-96, 394 A.2d at 341 (Handler, J., dissenting).
51 Id. Justice Handler reasoned that since in camera inspection is, in itself, a partial breach
of the privilege against forced disclosure, it should be allowed only when absolutely necessary.
Id. at 304, 394 A.2d at 352 (Handler, J., dissenting). Furthermore, while not alleging an absolute newsman's privilege, Justice Handler felt that it would be wrong to assess the shield law's
protection as merely "middling." Id. at 302, 394 A.2d at 351 (Handler, J., dissenting).
Rather, he noted the strong public policy considerations surrounding the newsman's
privilege and concluded that the majority failed to give sufficient weight to this public policy. As
a result, opined Justice Handler, the court "minimize[d] the serious impact which an in camera
inspection, with all its protective accoutrements, has upon the newsman's privilege." Id. at 303,
394 A.2d at 352 (Handler, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Justice Handler felt the proper solution
should have been to remand the case to the trial judge so that he could "complete the record."
In order to do so, he would have had to meet the threshold requirements of showing that in
camera inspection would provide materials and relevant information to the defense, is necessary
to the quest for the truth and could not be circumvented by acquiring the information from an
alternative source. Id. at 305-08, 394 A.2d at 353-54 (Handler, J., dissenting).
S2 Id. at 284-85, 394 A.2d 342-43 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 285, 394 A.2d 330 at 343 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
Justice Pashman observed that the concept of due process required, at the very minimum,
that an opportunity to be heard be provided prior to permitting deprivations of liberty. Id. at
284, 394 A.2d at 342. (Pashman, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); State v. Standard Oil Co., 5 N.J. 281, 74 A.2d 565, aff'd,
341 U.S. 428 (1950). Accordingly, he found "it totally unimaginable that the majority" of the
court were prepared to send Farber to jail without first allowing him to challenge the legality of
the order compelling in camera disclosure. 78 N.J. at 285, 394 A.2d at 343 (Pashman, J.,
dissenting).
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struing the New Jersey shield law, Justice Pashman asserted that it
was an expression of the "Legislature's judgment that an uninhibited
news media is more important to the proper functioning of our society than is the ability of either law enforcement agencies, the courts
54
or criminal defendants to gain access to confidential news data."
Viewing the statutory privilege as "paramount," Justice Pashman felt
it was not necessary to employ either a balancing test or a case by
case approach in determining whether the shield law would be
applicable. 55 Rather, he believed that newsmen have blanket protection against compelled disclosure whenever they fall within the purview of the statute. 5 6 This absolutist approach was tempered by Justice Pashman's recognition of the fundamental principle that a statute
will not be allowed to stand when it violates an individual's constitutional rights. 5 7 In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting statutory
and constitutional values involved, Justice Pashman, like Justice
Handler, prescribed a set of procedural safeguards which should be
employed before in camera inspection would be allowed. 58 These

78 N.J. at 287, 394 A.2d at 344 (Pashman, J.,dissenting). A basic premise underlying
Justice Pashman's analysis of appellants' claims to a statutory newsman's privilege was the fact
that the shield law is as protective of the privilege of nondisclosure as the first amendment
would have been had such a constitutional right existed. See id.at 289, 394 A.2d at 345
(Pashman, J., dissenting). Thus, according to Justice Pashman, it was unnecessary to pass on the
merits of appellants' claim to a first amendment newsman's privilege. Id. Rather, he saw the
shield law as the legislature's response to. Branzburg v. Hayes, which left the states free to
determine the desirability of a newsman's privilege and to fashion "within First Amendment
limits ...their own standards . . . with respect to the relations between law enforcement
officials and [the] press ...." 408 U.S. 665, 706 (1972). In his analytical approach to the
newsman's privilege, Justice Pashman interpreted the shield law as providing an absolute
privilege of nondisclosure:
Realizing that strict confidentiality is essential to the workings of a free press,
our Legislature, through the News Media Privilege Act, has granted reporters an
immunity from disclosure which is both absolute and comprehensive. Any person
connected with any news media for the purpose of gathering or disseminating news
is granted the privilege of refusing to disclose, in any legal or quasi-legal proceedings or before any investigative body, both the source of and any information acquired.
78 N.J. at 288, 394 A.2d at 344 (Pashman, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
55 78 N.J. at 288, 394 A.2d at 344 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Justice Pashman felt the Legislature had already done the weighing and balancing. Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 289-90, 394 A.2d at 345 (Pashman, J.,
dissenting).
58 Id. at 292-93, 394 A.2d at 346-47 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Essentially, the procedural
mechanism requires (1) the reporter to make a prima facie showing that he comes within the
statute and that the information he seeks to withhold was obtained in the course of his newsgathering duties, (2) the criminal defendant to make a threshold showing that the information is
material and relevant to his defense and not available from another source, (3) that only the
materials deemed to be relevant and necessary to the defense be disclosed at an in camera
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safeguards need be implemented only where the constitutional rights
of a criminal defendant are threatened. In all other cases, according
59
to Justice Pashman, the privilege would be absolute.
The First Amendment Issue
The Farbercase represents one of the most recent developments
in the area of case law involving a reporter's claim to a constitutional
newsman's privilege. 60 While cases asserting the "right" of a newsman to withhold confidential information were not unknown in the
past, 6 ' claims based upon constitutional considerations are of fairly
recent origin. 62 The first such instance occurred in 1958 in Garland
v. Torre.6 3 In that case, singer Judy Garland brought suit against
the Columbia Broadcasting System, (CBS) alleging that a CBS executive had made false and defamatory statements against her. 64 These
unidentified statements had been published in a newspaper article
written by columnist Marie Torre. Despite repeated requests by
plaintiff's counsel, Torre refused to divulge the identity of the alleged
informant and she was ultimately held in criminal contempt. 65 An
appeal followed wherein Torre asserted that forced disclosure of confidential information would abridge the right to freedom of the press
guaranteed by the first amendment. 66 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected this contention, however,
holding that disclosure of the informant's identity was essential to

inspection and (4) the judge to inspect the materials to determine their relevancy and necessity
to the defense. Furthermore, any questions as to whether disclosure was appropriate would be
decided in the newsman's favor. Id. at 293, 394 A.2d 347 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 293, 394 A.2d at 347 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
60 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C.
1972); In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 62 N.J. 80,
299 A.2d 77 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991 (1973); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181
(1963).
61 See, e.g., People v. Durrant, 116 Cal. 179, 48 P. 75 (1897); Clein v. State, 52 So. 2d 117
(Fla. 1950); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1943); In re Grunow, 84
N.J.L. 235, 85 A. 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291,
199 N.E. 415 (1936).
62 See Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
63 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
64 Id. at 547.
65 Id.
66 Id. Essentially, Torre claimed that compelled disclosure of confidential information would
unconstitutionally impair the free flow of news to the public, thereby restricting its access to
information. She also presented a public policy argument asserting that society's interest in the
"unrestricted flow of news" necessitated a finding of at least a qualified newsman's privilege. Id.
at 548.
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"the fair administration of justice." 6 7 The court held further that the
right to obtain the desired information was "paramount" to any first
amendment considerations which may have been involved since the
informant's identity "went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim." 6 8
After Torre, a few of the courts which considered the question of
69
a constitutional newsman's privilege held that such a right existed.
However, in most instances, assertions of a newsman's privilege to
70
withhold confidential information were rejected.
More than a decade after the Torre decision, the United States
Supreme Court examined the question of a first amendment newsman's privilege in Branzburg v. Hayes. 7 ' Branzburg involved four
cases 72 in which three members of the news media claimed that forcing them to reveal confidential information in grand jury proceedings
violated the free speech and free press guarantees of the first
amendment. 73 In a five to four opinion authored by Justice White,
67 Id. at 549. The court's decision was grounded on the fact that obtaining the name of the
CBS executive was crucial to the success of the plaintiffs' suit. For only if the source of the
alleged defamatory remarks were actually a CBS executive, would Miss Garland have had a
cause of action against the broadcasting company.
Id. at 549-50. By evaluating the necessity of the undisclosed information to the overall
outcome of the case, Judge Stewart (now Justice) enunciated what has become known as the
"heart of the matter" test. See id. at 550. Essentially, this test requires that the confidential
information be important to the resolution of the controversy before disclosure will be compelled. See Note, supra note 1, 80 YALE L.J. at 322-23.
69 See People v. Dohrn, Order No. 69-3808 (Cook County, I1l. Cir. Ct. Crim. Div. 1970);
Adams v. Associated Press, 46 F.R.D. 439 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
70 See, e.g., In re Goodfader, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961); In re Bridge, 120 N.J.
Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (App. Div.), certif denied, 62 N.J. 80, 299 A.2d 77, cert. denied, 410
U.S. 991 (1973); State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905
(1968); In re Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
illustrative of the reception met by reporters' claiming a first amendment privilege of nondisclosure in the pre-Branzburg era is the courts' language in In re Taylor. In that case, the
court succinctly stated that "[t]he language of [the] Constitution is clear, and by no stretch of
language can it protect or include under 'freedom of the press,' the non-disclosure of sources of
information." 412 Pa. at 39, 193 A.2d at 184.
71 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Prior to Branzburg, the Supreme Court had denied certiorari three
times to cases involving claims to a newsman's privilege. See State v. Buchanan, 392 U.S. 905,
denying cert. to 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729 (1968); Murphy v. Colorado, 365 U.S. 843 (1961)
(unreported state court proceedings); Garland v. Torre, 358 U.S. 910, denying cert. to 259 F.2d
545 (2d Cir. 1958).
72 Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Meig, 503 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. Ct. App. 1971), aff'd sub
nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1970), affd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); In re Pappas, 358 Mass.
604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), affd sub non. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
73 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburg v. Pound, involved petitioner Branzburg, a reporter for
the Louisville, Kentucky Courier-Journal. Branzburg had written several newspaper articles
concerning the use of drugs in the area around Frankfort, Kentucky. In one article, which
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the Court decided that the first amendment afforded the press no
shield against compelled disclosure of confidential information to a
grand jury in a good faith criminal investigation. 74 The Court
reasoned that since the average citizen possessed no immunity from
the reach of grand jury subpoenas, the press should not be allowed to
occupy a privileged position. 75 Recognizing that the ability to subpoena witnesses is essential to the investigative function of the grand

appeared in the Courier-Journal on November 15, 1969, Branzburg described his experiences as
an observer of two youths synthesizing hashish from marijuana. In a related story, published on
January 10, 1971, petitioner reported on the use of drugs among young people in Frankfort. He
spent several weeks interviewing drug users and observed a number of them smoking
marijuana. In both instances, Branzburg was subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury to answer questions concerning his knowledge of these drug activities. However, he refused to testify claiming that such a stance was authorized by the first amendment. Id. at 667-71.
In re Pappas involved a reporter for a television station in New Bedford, Massachusetts. In
re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971), affd sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665 (1972). During the course of reporting on civil disorders, this petitioner attended a news
conference held by the Black Panthers in their headquarters. He later gained reentry to the
headquarters only upon his promise that he would not report on anything he saw or heard
there. Petitioner kept that promise and neither published a story nor otherwise revealed anything about the occurrences at Black Panther headquarters. Several months later, he was summoned before a grand jury to testify as to what had taken place while he was among the Black
Panthers. Claiming that the first amendment afforded a privilege against forced disclosure of
confidential information, petitioner refused to answer these questions. The case was reported to
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, which decided "that there exists no constitutional
newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute, to refuse to appear and testify before a court
or grand jury." 358 Mass. at 612, 266 N.E.2d at 302-03.
In the third case, New York Times reporter Earl Caldwell was served with a subpoena
duces tecum directing him to appear before a federal grand jury and to bring with him the
notes and tapes of interviews concerning the Black Panther organization and its members. See
Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 359 (N.D. Cal. 1970). Caldwell moved to quash the
subpoena asserting that it abridged his first amendment rights. 311 F. Supp. at 360. Although
this motion was denied, the district court, nonetheless, issued a protective order which permitted Caldwell to withhold "confidential associations, sources or information received, developed
or maintained by him as a professional journalist in the course of his efforts to gather news for
dissemination to the public through the press or other news media." Id. at 362. Thereafter, a
new grand jury issued a subpoena ad testificandum, and again Caldwell made a motion to
quash. Although, this motion was denied, Caldwell persisted in his refusal to testify before the
grand jury. As a result, he was ordered committed for contempt. On appeal of the contempt
order, the court of appeals reversed, holding that Caldwell would not be required to testify at
all since his mere attendance before the grand jury might endanger the public's right to be
informed. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d at 1089.
Petitioners Branzburg, Pappas and the United States were subsequently granted writs of
certiorari to review the adverse judgments of the lower courts. Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S. 942
(1971), In re Pappas, 402 U.S. 942 (1971); United States v. Caldwell, 402 U.S. 942 (1971).
74 408 U.S. at 690-91.
75 Id. at 682. At least one commentator has suggested that the Court's reasoning that the
press is not immune from the general obligation of all citizens to answer questions regarding
criminal activity amounted to a "reformulat[ion] [of] the issue to remove any apparent first
amendment question." See Murasky, supra note 1, at 837.
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jury,7 the court decided that a first amendment newsman's privilege
could not be sustained "on the theory that it is better to write about
crime than to do something about it."77 Moreover, Justice White
eschewed a balancing test for determining when a reporter could
properly invoke a first amendment privilege of nondisclosure. 78 He
opined that use of a balancing test would entail the impracticable task
of predicting the circumstances in which a newsman could validly invoke the privilege. 7 9 According to Justice White, this would lead to
"conceptual difficulties of a high order." 80 Instead, the Court decided that a newsman's privilege founded upon first amendment
guarantees was not comprehended by the Constitution.8 1 Accordingly, the Court left it to Congress to determine the advisability of a
statutory privilege on the federal level, and to the states to define
"within First Amendment limits" the relationship between their gov8 2
ernment processes and the press.
Despite the general rejection of a constitutional newsman's
privilege in Branzburg, the Court there apparently recognized a limited right of newsmen to withhold confidential information, by its
declaration that the newsgathering right was not without its first
amendment protections.8 3 Thus, the vagueness inherent in the
Court's language in Branzburg has led to speculation concerning the
precise dimensions of that decision. One commentator has suggested
that the Branzburg Court did not "unequivocally reject" the concept

76 408 U.S. at 688.
77 Id. at 692.
7a Id. at 701-06. The reporters in Branzburg claimed that prior to being forced to reveal

confidential information before a grand jury, the state must first show that a crime has been
committed and that the reporters possess information that is both relevant to the grand jury
investigation and unavailable through another source. Thus, these reporters claimed a conditional privilege which would require them to testify given some compelling need for the information. Id. at 701-02.
79 See id. at 702 n.39.
8o Id. at 704. The conceptual difficulties anticipated by Justice White involved the preliminary findings of fact and law which the courts would be compelled to make before requiring a
reporter to testify. In Justice White's view, if a balancing test were employed, the courts would
be required to demonstrate that there was probable cause to believe that a crime had been
committed, and that the reporter has relevant information which could not be obtained
elsewhere before he could be compelled to testify at a grand jury proceeding. This process,
according to Justice White, could well have the undesirable effect of allowing the judiciary to
undermine the legislature by passing on the "compellingness" of the interests served by legislative enactments. Id. at 704-06.
s Id. at 692.
82

Id. at 706.

s3 Id. at 681. Indeed, the Court stated that "without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." Id.
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of a first amendment shield, but merely rejected it in the context of
84
that case.
The confusion surrounding Branzburg is aggravated by the concurring opinion of Justice Powell in that case. 8 5 Characterized as
"enigmatic" by Justice Stewart in his dissent,8 6 it is nonetheless significant as an attempted clarification of the plurality position. In his
concurrence, Justice Powell emphasized what he perceived as the limited scope of the plurality holding. 8 7 He asserted that their decision did not circumscribe the constitutional rights afforded newsmen.
On the contrary, Justice Powell advocated employment of a balancing
approach, to be applied on a case by case basis, in order to achieve
the proper balance between freedom of the press and the necessity of
88
obtaining relevant information regarding criminal activity
Notwithstanding the uncertainty which stems from the
Branzburg holding, the Supreme Court of New Jersey relied squarely
thereon in reaching its decision in Farber.8 9 Justice Mountain conclusively stated that the court's rejection of the claim to a constitutional newsman's privilege was based upon the binding application of
the Branzburg decision. He reasoned that the Branzburg ruling relating to compelling testimony before grand juries could be extended to
include compelling testimony at a criminal trial. 90
Although the United States Supreme Court and the New Jersey
supreme court have rejected a constitutionally mandated balancing
test, just such an approach has evolved in many of the postBranzburg cases involving claims to a first amendment newsman's

84

See Comment, supra note 1, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. at 171-72, 175-76. This author be-

lieves that instead of denying a constitutional newsman's privilege of nondisclosure, the

Branzburg Court actually "'laid the foundation" for adoption of a limited one. Id. at 171. The
author sees a qualified privilege as the "logical result" of the Branzburg Court's recognition that
newsgathering is entitled to some first amendment protection. Id. at 172. See Note, Newsman's

Privilege to Refuse Disclosure of Confidential Sources in Criminal Trial, 51 WASH. L. REv.
1005, 1010-11 & n.23 (1976). But see Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINCS L.J. 709, 716 (1975).
85 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
86 Id.

at 725 (Stewart, J.,dissenting).
7 Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
8 Id. at 710 (Powell, J.,concurring). Justice Powell asserted that "[t]he balance of these

vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and

traditional way of adjudicating such questions." Id.
85 78 N.J. at 266, 394 A.2d at 333.
90 Id. at 268-69, 394 A.2d at 334. Additionally, the court noted that it was unnecessary to
engage in a process of balancing the societal interests involved in its decision to reject appellants' assertion of a constitutional newsman's privilege since the Supreme Court had already

done any weighing and balancing that was required. Id. at 268, 394 A.2d at 334.
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privilege. 91 Indeed, in one of these cases the court has even gone so
far as to hold that the need for balancing the competing values in
non-grand jury cases, emanates from the Branzburg decision. 9 2 Justice Handler, in his dissenting opinion in Farber, recognized that
while adoption of a balancing test might have been an unjustified
extension of Branzburg, it nonetheless would have illustrated the fact
93
that newsgathering involves an issue of constitutional implication.
Thus, Justice Powell's concurrence in Branzburg has taken on a
greater significance in light of the subsequent adherence to its view
that the public interest in preserving the free flow of news must be
balanced against the obligation to disclose relevant information re94
garding criminal conduct.
Assuming then, that Branzburg implicitly authorized some form
of qualified newsman's privilege, a question remains as to when that
privilege may be legitimately exercised. While several postBranzburg cases may shed some light on this issue, it is important for
analytical purposes to distinguish those cases in which the claim of
privilege arose in a criminal context from those in which it arose during the course of civil litigation. In criminal cases, a much stronger
case can be made for a qualified or conditional newsman's privilege
which must yield in proper situations. Civil suits, however, except
perhaps libel actions, are much more conducive to application of an
5
absolute privilege. 9
In United States v. Liddy 96 the court denied a motion by the
Los Angeles Times to quash a subpoena duces tecum directing them
91 See, e.g., Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912
(1976); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966

(1974); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974). But see In re Bridge, 120 N.J.
Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (App. Div.), certif denied, 62 N.J. 80, 299 A.2d 77 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 991 (1973). In Bridge, the New Jersey superior court, appellate division, held that a
reporter had no first amendment privilege to refuse to testify before a grand jury regarding his
knowledge of an alleged bribery attempt on a commissioner of the Newark Housing Authority.
Relying on Branzburg, the court not only rejected the reporter's assertion of such a privilege,
but also ruled that no balancing test was necessary to determine the predominant societal interest. Id. at 466-67, 295 A.2d at 6-7.

92 See Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
This holding apparently exceeds the boundaries of the Supreme Court's holding in Branzburg
which avoided the balancing test approach. See 78 N.J. at 300, 394 A.2d at 350 (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
93 78 N.J. at 300, 394 A.2d at 350 (Handler, J., dissenting).
94 See State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 269-70, 315 A.2d 254, 255 (1974). The appellants in
Farberalso contended that Justice Powell's Branzburg concurrence was of critical importance to
their constitutional claims. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 5, at 33-34. But see 78 N.J. at
268, 394 A.2d at 334.
95 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 1, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. at 176-80.
96 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C. 1972). This case was decided less than six months after the
Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg. For this reason, it may be asserted that an effective
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to produce a tape of a conversation with Alfred C. Baldwin, III, a
Watergate co-conspirator. Baldwin had been granted immunity by the
government and was to be one of its key witnesses at trial. 97 The
defendants sought the tape in order to impeach Baldwin's testimony.
The court ruled that the Times had no privilege under the first
amendment to withhold information which may be necessary to criminal defendants at trial. 98 In that regard, the court stated that the
holding in Branzburg was not limited to grand jury proceedings, but
that it could be extended to "den[y] a privilege in favor of the rights
of an accused to a fair trial." 99 While the court did not specifically
employ a balancing test, it did observe that if such a test were necessary, the due process rights of criminal defendants would always prevail. 10 0 Moreover, the court did not require a showing of the relevancy, materiality and unavailability of the tape when it ordered it to
be produced. 101
Later, in State v. St. Peter 102 the question of a constitutional
newsman's privilege again arose in a criminal setting. In that case, a
newsman refused to answer certain questions in a deposition regarding his prior knowledge of a drug raid. 10 3 He based his refusal on a
claim to a first amendment newsman's privilege. 1 4 The court first
decided that Branzburg did not negate the possibility of a qualified
newsman's privilege. 10 5 In addition, the court held that a balancing

balancing approach had not yet crystallized for dealing with the type of issues presented there.
See Goodale, supra note 84, at 728-29.
9' 354 F. Supp. at 209-10.
98 Id. at 214-15.
99 Id. at 213, 215. In support of its rationale, the Liddy court cited many passages from
Branzburg from which it can be inferred that the Court considered criminal trials to be within
the scope of its holding. See id. at 213 n.13 (quoting 408 U.S. at 680) ("they assert that the
reporter should not be forced either to appear or to testify before a grand jury or at trial.")
(emphasis added); id. (quoting 408 U.S. at 690-91) ("the First Amendment interest asserted . . .
was outweighed by the general obligation of a citizen to appear before a grand jury or at trial.")
(emphasis added); id. ("We perceive no basis for holding that the public interest . . . is insufficient to override the . . . burden on news gathering that is said to result from insisting that
reporters . . . respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury
investigation or criminal trial.") (emphasis added).
'0 354 F. Supp. at 215.
101 See Goodale, supra note 84, at 727.

132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254 (1974).
Id. at 268, 315 A.2d at 255. The defendants, who were indicted as a result of the drug
raid, sought to discover the source of the reporter's information. Id.
104 Id. The reporter also claimed that there had been no showing that the questions asked of
him were material, relevant and necessary to the defendants. Id.
105 "But the language and attitude of the Branzburg majority does not indicate an entire
absence of concern for the news gathering function so relevant to the full exercise of the First
Amendment." Id.
102

103

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:333

test should be employed to determine if the newsman's privilege had
to yield to the defendants' need for the information. By applying this
test, the court felt that the newsman could withhold the confidential
information unless it could be shown "that there [was] no other
adequately available source for the information and that it [was] relevant and material on the issue of guilt or innocence." 106
Several months thereafter, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Brown v. Commonwealth.'0 7 Utilizing a rationale similar to
that used in St. Peter, the court recognized the existence of a newsman's privilege emanating from the first amendment. According to
the Brown court, a newsman should not be compelled to disclose
confidential information when such nondisclosure does not clash with
10 8
a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial.
Another case, Farrv. Pitchess,109 well illustrates the applicability
of the balancing test approach in criminal contexts where a claim of
privilege is asserted. There, reporter William Farr published a statement of a potential witness in the Manson family murder case, in
violation of the trial judge's order banning any public dissemination of
proposed trial testimony. 110 The judge sought to discover the identity of the informants who supplied Farr with the copies of the statement. Farr persistently refused to divulge his sources, and was found
to be in contempt of court. Thereafter, he petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus claiming a first amendment privilege against forced
disclosure of his confidential source."' The district court denied the
petition and this decision was upheld by the court of appeals. In
reaching its determination, the court read Branzburg as authorizing a
Id. at 256.
107 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974). In Brown, a newswoman
refused to disclose the source of her information with respect to a story she had written about a
local murder. This article, which included information obtained from "a spokesman in the Stafford County Sheriff's Department" stated that the murder victim and one Kearns had come
upon two unknown men at night in a junkyard. According to the article, the unknown men
shouted "Hey" and then fired two shots, killing the victim. At trial, however, Kearns testified
that it was actually the victim who shouted to the men. Id. at 756, 204 S.E.2d at 430.
108 Id. at 757, 204 S.E.2d at 431. The court held that a defendant has a due process right
which must prevail over the newsman's privilege of nondisclosure when the information sought
"is material to proof of any element of a criminal offense, or to proof of the defense asserted by
the defendant, or to a reduction in the classification . . . of the offense charged, or to a mitigation of the penalty attached." Id. In light of these criteria, the Brown court upheld the newsman's claim of privilege since it decided that the identity of the informant was irrelevant to the
defendant's case. Id. See also United States v. Calvert, No. 74-107 (E.D. Mo., filed April 26,
1974).
,09 522 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
110 Id. at 466.
106

1I Id.

at 466-67.
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"limited or conditional" first amendment newsman's privilege."l 2 As
a result, the court decided that in "non-grand jury cases" 113 a balancing approach must be employed to ascertain whether the need for the
information outweighs the claim of privilege under the facts presented. 114
After Branzburg, assertions of a first amendment newsman's
privilege have also arisen extensively in civil litigation. 115 In Carey
v. Hume, 116 a reporter claimed a constitutional privilege for his refusal to identify the eyewitnesses who had supplied information for an
allegedly libelous story concerning a burglary at the headquarters of
the United Mine Workers. 1 17 The court rejected this argument and
affirmed the order directing disclosure of the sources. While the
court recognized that Branzburg could be distinguished since that
claim of privilege arose in a criminal context, it nonetheless reasoned
that "civil litigation [also] has its entitlements on proper occasion to
the pursuit of truth wherever it may be found." 118 In deciding just
what constitutes such a "proper occasion," the court adopted the case
by case balancing approach first propounded in Garland v. Torre."19
In Herbert v. Lando, 12 0 the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff
in a libel action could inquire into the editorial processes of the journalists who were responsible for dissemination of an allegedly defamatory television report and magazine article. In so doing, the
Id.
113 Id. at 468. The court in Farr held that disclosure would be required since the interest in
preserving defendant's right to a fair trial, "free of adverse publicity," was paramount to the
newsman's privilege. Id. For a comprehensive analysis and critique of the Farr decision, see
Note, supra note 85.
114 Three basic tests have evolved in determining when a newsman may be forced to testify
or disclose confidential information in a criminal setting.
To override the constitutional newsman's privilege, it must be shown first that the newsman has relevant and. material information in his possession; second, that this information is not
available from another source; and third, that there is a compelling need for the information
such that nondisclosure would prevent the administration of justice. See People v. Dohrn,
Order No. 69-3808, at 3 (Cook County, I1l. Cir. Ct. Crim. Div., 1970).
115 See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974);
Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973);
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
116 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974).
117 492 F.2d at 632-33. The story asserted that UMW president Tony Boyle and the union's
general counsel Ed Carey were seen removing boxes of documents from the union headquarters, which they later reported as stolen to the police. Id.
118 Id. at 632.
119 See note 68 supra and accompanying text. In that regard, the court stated that
"Branzburg, in language if not in holding, left intact, insofar as civil litigation is concerned, the
approach taken in Garland." 492 F.2d at 635-36.
120 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979).
112
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Court rejected the reporters' assertion of a first amendment protection against "inquiry into the state of mind of those who edit, produce
or publish, and into the editorial process." 121 The Court stated that
the rule enunciated in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 122 and other
related cases 123 requiring a plaintiff in a libel action to prove that the
defamatory falsehood was published with "actual malice," necessitated
inquiry into the state of mind of the defendant. 1 24 To hold otherwise, the Court concluded, would substantially preclude recovery of
damages for libel since a plaintiff would be required to meet an extraordinarily high burden of proof. 125 Although it was not expressly
articulated, the Court essentially employed the "heart of the matter"
test first enunciated in Garland,126 when it held that direct inquiry
into the editorial process was "critical" to proving actual malice in
27
libel actions. 1
In another civil context, the court in Baker v. F&F Investment 128 upheld a newsman's claims of privilege arising out of a federal class action under the Civil Rights Act. There, the plaintiffs
sought disclosure of the identity of a real estate agent who had
supplied a journalist with information regarding racial discrimination
in the sale of houses. 1 29 In weighing the competing societal values,
the court struck a balance in favor of the first amendment
privilege, 130 reasoning that the reporter was not a party to the class
action and that there were other means by which the plaintiffs might
have discovered the identity of the source. 13 1 More importantly however, the Baker court emphasized the civil nature of the case in
reaching its determination. Indeed, the court generalized that in civil
litigation the public interest protected by allowing newsmen to withhold "confidential news sources will often be weightier" when balanced against the private interest served by forced disclosure. 132
121
122

Id. at 1639.
376 U.S. 254 (1964).

12 See note 145 infra.
124 99 S. Ct. at 1641.
125

Id. at 1646.

126 See note 68 supra.
127 99 S. Ct. at 1646.

12s470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973).
129 Id.

at 781.

130Id. at 783. Citing the preferred status accorded to first amendment freedoms, the court in
Baker stated that the journalist's privilege should take precedence over the various interests
served by compelled disclosure "at the very least in civil cases." Id. However, the court admitted that there would be instances where the newsman's privilege would have to yield to a "rare
overriding and compelling interest." Id.
131 Id. at 783. See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394, 1396-98
(D.D.C. 1973).
132 470 F.2d at 785.
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Justice Powell again had the opportunity to express his beliefs
regarding the newsman's privilege in his dissenting opinion in Saxbe
v. Washington Post C0.133 In Saxbe, several press representatives
challenged the validity of a policy of the Federal Bureau of Prisons
which prohibited press interviews with individually designated inmates of federal prisons. The journalists alleged that this policy constituted an infringement upon the free press guarantee of the first
amendment. 134 A majority of the Supreme Court, relying in part
upon Branzburg, rejected this contention holding that newsmen have
no constitutional right to obtain information that is not generally accessible to the public.135 In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice
Powell opined that the decision in Branzburg did not compel that
result. 136 He maintained that since Branzburg endorsed some form
of constitutional newsman's privilege, a fair appraisal of that decision
13 7
should have resulted in application of a balancing test in Saxbe.
Despite Justice Powell's strong interest in preserving an unhampered newsgathering right, the extent to which such a right is constitutionally protected remains a matter of controversy. While the
Supreme Court has implicity recognized the existence of a newsgathering right, it has never passed directly on its scope. 13 8 Traditionally, the guarantee of freedom of the press operated principally
to prevent prior restraints upon publication. l3 9 Moreover, it has
0
been widely recognized that freedom of the press is not absolute.14
The Supreme Court has held on many occasions that the press is not
beyond the reach of criminal and civil statutes despite the burden
their application may inflict upon the free press guarantee. Thus, it
has been decided that the news media is not exempt from the reach

133 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
Id. at 844-45.
135 Id. at 850. Indeed, the Court noted that the access of the press to federal prisons substan134

tially exceeds that given to members of the general public. Id. at 849.
136 Id. at 859 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell did concede, however, that the language
of the plurality opinion in Branzburg "when read in isolation," may have lent support to the
stance taken by the majority in Saxbe. id. Consequently, he was not hesitant to point out that,
when considered in its entire context, Branzburg did not endorse a sweeping rejection of constitutional claims to protection of the newsgathering function of the press. Id. Indeed, even the
Branzburg plurality did not suggest that newsgathering was totally without first amendment
protection. Rather, it recognized that absent some protection for that process "freedom of the
press could be eviscerated." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 681.
137 417 U.S. at 859-60, 870-72 (Powell, J., dissenting).
138 See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
681 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965).
139 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931).
141 See id. at 708; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 682.
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of the Sherman Act,141 the National Labor Relations Act,' 4 2 and the
Fair Labor Standards Act.1 43 Additionally, newspapers may be taxed
in a non-discriminatory manner without abridging the free press pro144
vision of the first amendment.
In a similar vein, it is generally acknowledged that the press may
not publish libelous and defamatory stories without exposing itself to
potential liability. 1 4 5 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has consistwhere
ently held that the freedom of the press may be subordinated
46
it would interfere with an accused's right to a fair trial.1
Despite these limitations, many courts and commentators have
recognized the importance of a free press to the maintenance of
democratic principles. 147 It has been asserted that the functioning of
a democratic society is dependent upon a populace that is capable of
141 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945).
142 Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937).
514

14

Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1946).
See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1935). In Grosjean, the Supreme

Court struck down a Louisiana statute which imposed a tax upon newspapers having a circulation of more than 20,000 papers per week. The Court held that the statute violated the freedom
of the press clause of the first amendment since it constituted "a deliberate and calculated
device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled
in virtue of the constitutional guaranties.'" 297 U.S. at 250.
145 See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 152-53 (1967); Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964). The rule enunicated by the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan requires a public
official to prove that a defamatory statement was published "with 'actual malice'-that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 376 U.S.
at 279-80. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388.U.S. at 162-65 (extending the New York
Times rule to include "public figures"). This rule has proved to be very protective of the newsgathering function and the privilege of nondisclosure since it compels a plaintiff in a libel action
to meet a very high standard of proof before he can collect any damages. By requiring such a
high standard of proof, the Court's ruling is implicitly protective of the public's right to be
informed. But see Herbert v. Lando, 99 S. Ct. 1635 (1979) (plaintiff not barred by first amendment from inquiring into editorial processes of those responsible for circulating allegedly libelous falsehoods); Dow Jones & Co. v. Superior Court, 364 Mass. 317, 303 N.E.2d 847 (1973)
(court required newsman to reveal source who supplied information for allegedly libelous article
holding that there was no first amendment privilege of nondisclosure). Additionally, several
recent Supreme Court decisions indicate a trend toward narrowing the definition of a "public
figure." See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 47 U.S.L.W. 4827 (June 26, 1979); Wolston v. Reader's
Digest Ass'n, 47 U.S.L.W. 4840 (June 26, 1979).
146 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). Cf. Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 47 U.S.L.W.
4902 (July 2, 1979) (Court rejected newspaper's asserted right to attend pretrial suppression
hearing based on public trial guarantee of sixth amendment since defendant's right to fair trial
was paramount).
147 See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
680-81 (1972); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
508 (1946); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717-18 (1931); Note, supra note 1, 71 COLUM. L.
REV. 838 (1971); Note, supra note 1, 80 YALE L.J. at 326-34 (1970).
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making well informed decisions. In this scheme, the press plays the
vital role of maintaining the free flow of news. 14 8 While the Supreme Court has chosen to give constitutional recognition to several
aspects of the free press paradigm, 1 49 several post-Branzburg decisions have cast doubt upon the validity of a constitutionally mandated
newsgathering right. In Pell v. Procunier150 and Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 151 the Supreme Court upheld the respective policies of the
California Department of Corrections and the Federal Bureau of Prisons which prohibited press interviews with individually designated
prison inmates.1 52 Against arguments that such policies abridged the
newsgathering right guaranteed by the freedom of the press clause,
the Court in both cases decided that the press has "no constitutional
right of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the
general public." 153 By emphasizing the non-discriminatory aspect of
the interview ban, the Saxbe and Pell Courts apparently believed that
the threat on the flow of information posed by such a ban was one of
154
insufficient magnitude to warrant first amendment scrutiny.
148 See Note, supra note 1, 80 YALE L.J. at- 326-27. The right of newsmen to withhold
confidential information is usually viewed as a logical extension of the public's need for adequate
access to information. Id. at 328. Several reasons have been suggested for this, including the
fact that newsmen often will obtain information from sources who wish to remain anonwnous.
Any forced disclosure of these sources, it is contended, will result in a deterrent effect upon
both informants and reporters who publish stories based upon information supplied by informants. Id. at 329.
149 See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (right to distribute information); Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (right of press to be free from prior restraints upon publication).
150 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
151 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
'52 Pell, 417 U.S. at 835; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
'53 Pell, 417 U.S. at 834; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850. But see Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 856-64 (Powell,
J., dissenting). Although Justice Powell agreed with the majority that the members of the press
are not above regulation by the government, he did not agree with their apparent conclusion
that restraints on access to newsworthy information "are constitutionally irrelevant" so long as
they are not discriminatory. Id. at 858 (Powell, J., dissenting). Rather, he argued that some
restrictions on the newsgathering process are of constitutional importance and therefore require
constitutional scrutiny. According to Justice Powell:
[a]t some point official restraints on access to news sources, even though not directed solely at the press, may so undermine the function of the First Amendment
that it is both appropriate and necessary to require the government to justify such
regulations in terms more compelling than discretionary authority and administrative convenience.
Id. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell then concluded that the interview ban constituted one of those restraints which had first amendment ramifications since it impaired the
availability of information to the public concerning this country's prisons. Id. at 860-61 (Powell,
J., dissenting). Accordingly, he proposed that a balancing test be implemented to ascertain
whether the government's interest in restricting prisoner-press interviews sufficiently outweighs
the hindrance it imposes on the free flow of information. Id. at 870-74 (Powell, J., dissenting).
154 See note 153 supra.
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In Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 155 the Supreme Court held
that a search warrant could issue on a newspaper, where there was
probable cause for believing that it had criminal evidence on its premises, despite the fact that the newspaper itself was not suspected of
any criminal involvement. 156 The Court rejected the contention that
there were "additional factors" stemming from the newsgathering
right of the first amendment which permitted only subpoenas duces
tecum in such situations. 157 In reaching this determination, the
Court stated that, like the Branzburg Court, it was not persuaded
"that confidential news sources will disappear and that the press will
suppress news because of fears of warranted searches." 158
Despite the belief by some courts that the free flow of news is
not inhibited by forcing newsmen to disclose confidential information,
it is generally recognized that the newsman's privilege plays an important part in "maximiz[ing] the flow of information to the public." 159 To determine the scope of the newsman's privilege and
when it should prevail over other interests, one commentator has
suggested that the court should properly consider the content of the
information to be disclosed, the circumstances under which it was
obtained, and the circumstances surrounding the demand for
disclosure-including the nature of the case, the importance of disclosure to resolution of the issues in the case, and the availability of
the information from other sources. 160
Yet the Farber court, in its rejection of a first amendment
newsman's privilege, found it unnecessary to engage in the balancing
of first and sixth amendment rights.
5n 436 U.S. 547 (1978). In Zurcher, members of a student newspaper sought declaratory and
injunctive relief against the police officers who searched their headquarters for pictures identify-

ing the persons who assaulted police officers during a demonstration. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of California granted the declaratory judgment. 353 F. Supp.

124, 136 (1972). The court held that the press has greater fourth amendment protection in cases
involving search warrants than do ordinary citizens in light of the possible infringements upon
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of the press. Id. at 134-35, Thus, the court held that
in cases wherein a newspaper is not suspected of a crime, the appropriate means of obtaining

evidence is by subpoena duces tecum. Specifically recognizing-a first amendment newsgathering
right, the court held that in deference to 'this right, a search warrant would be permitted "only
in the rare circumstances where there is a clear showing that (1) important materials will be

destroyed .. .and (2) a restraining order would be futile." Id. at 135 (emphasis in original). The
court of appeals affirmed the decision, 550 F.2d 464 (1977), and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari, 434 U.S. 816 (1977).
156 436 U.S. at 554.
157 Id. at 559.

158 Id. at 566. Indeed, the Court noted that the effect on the newsgathering process caused
by search warrants would make no "constitutional difference." Id.
159Murasky, supra note 1, at 915.
160Id. at 916-17.
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The Right to Compulsory Process
In Farber, the court was called upon to reconcile two competing
interests-appellants' assertion of a newsman's privilege and the accused's right to a fair trial. Specifically, Dr. Jascalevich maintained
that nondisclosure of the subpoenaed materials would impair his right
"to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor," a
right guaranteed under both the United States and New Jersey Constitutions.' 6 1 As previously indicated, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey found this argument "unassailable." 162 However, the court
admitted candidly that the compulsory process clause had remained
largely uninterpreted since its adoption. 163 Indeed, it was not until
1967, in Washington v. Texas, 16 4 that the United States Supreme
Court directly construed the compulsory process clause. 165 This lack
of explication takes on added significance in light of what appellants
perceived as the total "misapprehen[sion]'" of the leading compulsory
166
process cases by the New Jersey supreme court.
In Washington, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
two Texas procedural statutes which prohibited persons charged as
co-participants in the same crime from testifying on behalf of a codefendant. 16 7 The Court found that these statutes abridged the

161 U.S. CONST. amend. VI; N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 10. New Jersey's compulsory process

clause is identical to that found in the federal constitution. Moreover, all but two states (New
York and Nevada) have compulsory process provisions, many of which are directly patterned
after the language of the sixth amendment. For a comprehensive look at the wordings of various
state compulsory process clauses, see Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L.
REV. 73, 73 n.1 (1974).
162 78 N.J. at 272, 394 A.2d at 336.
163 Id.
1- 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
'65 The Supreme Court has construed the compulsory process clause on only four occasions
since Washington. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975); Cool v. United States, 409
U.S. 100 (1972); Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); United States v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348
(1969).
166 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 5, at 28.
167 388 U.S. at 23. In Washington, the petitioner was convicted of murder and sentenced to

fifty years in prison. However, the testimony at trial revealed a dispute as to who had actually
done the killing. According to the petitioner, it was one Charles Fuller who had fired the fatal
shot. In support of this testimony, the petitioner sought to introduce Fuller as a witness in his
behalf. The record indicated that Fuller was willing to testify for the petitioner and that his
version of the facts would have coincided with that of petitioner. Id. at 16. However, Fuller had
been previously convicted of the same crime, and according to two Texas statutes was barred
from testifying for his co-defendant. This was true even though there was no similar prohibition
against testifying for the state. Id. at 16-17. See Rangel v. State, 22 Tex. Ct. App. 642, 3 S.W.
788 (1887).
The Supreme Court first held that the compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment is
applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 388 U.S.
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compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment. 168 As the Court
noted, the historical basis for including the compulsory process clause
within the sixth amendment was to alleviate the harsh common law
rule that did not allow an accused to call witnesses in his defense in
cases of treason and felony. 69 Despite general abolition of this rule,
there remained several classes of witnesses, most notably codefendants, who were not regarded as competent to testify for each
other and who were prohibited from doing so. It was this arbitrary
disqualification of witnesses who were capable of testifying which the
Washington Court sought to eliminate when it invoked the compulsory process clause. 17 0 Thus, the Court held that compulsory process
included the right to offer the testimony of witnesses into evidence in
addition to the right to compel their attendance, and that these rights
may not be arbitrarily denied.171 Yet, the Court noted further, and
appellants in Farber subsequently relied thereupon, that the decision
to apply the compulsory process clause to prohibit the arbitrary dis-

at 18-19. In reaching this determination, the Court held that the right to compulsory process is
essentially equivalent to the right to present a defense. Id. at 19. See Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284,302 (1973) ("[flew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present
witnesses in his own defense"). Viewing such a right as "a fundamental element of due process
of law," the Washington Court then decided that the two statutes in question there violated the
compulsory process clause of the sixth amendment. 388 U.S. at 19, 23. Essentially, the Court
concluded that the right to compulsory process necessarily encompassed the right to offer the
testimony of defense witnesses as well as the right to compel their attendance in court. Id. at
23.
Accordingly, the Texas statutes were invalidated since they "arbitrarily" prevented a
defendant from presenting the testimony of a witness "who was physically and mentally capable
of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been
relevant and material to the defense." Id. It was recognized that the circumstances under which
Texas permitted a co-defendant to testify-either where he has been acquitted at his own trial or
where he testifies for the prosecution-are precisely the situations in which he is most apt to
commit perjury. Id. at 22-23.
168 Id. at 23.
169 Id. at 19 (citing 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 2§ 1786-1788 (1st ed. 1833)). While the prohibition against the introduction of defense
witnesses had been abolished in England by the early part of the 18th Century, common law
restrictions on the types of witnesses who were capable of testifying persisted. 388 U.S. at 20.
Co-defendants were generally regarded as incompetent to testify for one another because of
their interest in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. at 19-20. See Benson v. United States, 146
U.S. 325, 335 (1892); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 180 (1851). See generally 2 J.
WICMORE, EVIDENCE § 575 (3d ed. 1940). The Supreme Court later expressly overruled Reid
in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918). However, this was done on non-constitutional
grounds without consideration of the applicability of the compulsory process clause.
170 388 U.S. at 23.
171 Id. The Court concluded that "[tihe Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit
the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose
testimony he had no right to use." Id.
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qualification of witnesses rested on different principles than those underlying testimonial privileges. 172 Consequently, the appellants in
Farber contended that the Washington case stands only for the proposition that arbitrary prohibitions against allowing competent witnesses to testify will not be tolerated under the compulsory process
clause. They asserted that the principle enunciated in Washington
had no bearing on the right of the press to withhold confidential information.

173

Subsequently, in United States v. Nixon,' 74 the Supreme Court
was called upon to decide whether the President of the United States
could validly refrain from complying with a subpoena duces tecum
based upon a claim of executive privilege.' 7 5 The subpoena was issued by the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
which treated the subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged
yet issued an order for in camera inspection. The Supreme Court
subsequently granted a writ of certiorari. In its decision the Court
held that the privilege was not absolute and required President Nixon
176
to comply with the subpoena.
Based upon this sparse constitutional authority, 77 the New Jersey supreme court held that the state and federal compulsory process
172 Id. at 23 n.21. The Washington Court qualified its holding regarding the scope of the
compulsory process clause when it stated that:
Nothing in this opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial
privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination or the lawyer-client or
husband-wife privileges, which are based on entirely different considerations from
those underlying the common-law disqualifications for interest.
Id.
173 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 5, at 28-29.
174 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
175Id. at 703.
176 Id. at 711, 713. It should be noted, however, that the decision in Nixon was not based
upon the sixth amendment compulsory process clause. Rather, it was determined that "fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice" required the
result. Id. at 713. The compulsory process clause was not implicated in Nixon since that constitutional provision protects the rights of a criminal defendant, and not those of a prosecutor.
177 Prior to Washington, the Supreme Court had addressed the compulsory process clause
only five times, and failed to construe it on each occasion. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,
378 n.1 (1966); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 442 (1932); United States v. Van
Duzee, 140 U.S. 169, 173 (1891); Ex Parte Harding, 120 U.S. 782, 783--84 (1887); United States
v. Reid, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 180, 184-86 (1851), overruled in Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S.
467 (1918).
The reasons for the lack of reliance on the compulsory process clause are not entirely clear.
One commentator has suggested that because litigants have failed to look to compulsory process
issues, courts have strained to find other analyses in deciding cases that might well have come
within the purview of compulsory process. See Westen, supra note 161, at 108. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961), wherein the Court held that a Georgia statute which
prohibited a defendant from making any sworn statements in his behalf violated his right to be
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clauses mandated their decision in Farber.178 While it appears that
this holding was entirely just and reasonable, it may be that the New
Jersey supreme court reached the right decision for the wrong
reasons. In view of the case law, a more solid basis for the Farber
holding would seem to have been due process rather than compulsory
process. From an historical standpoint, the compulsory process clause
was adopted into the sixth amendment almost exactly as written by
James Madison 179 and largely without any debate regarding its contents.1 8 0 Over the years, this had led to a good deal of conjecture as
to what the framers intended its scope to be. Essentially, the compulsory process clause is the counterpart of the confrontation clause
which provides an accused with the right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him." 181 However, compulsory process is unlike
the confrontation clause and the other clauses of the sixth amendment
in that compulsory process applies only when it is affirmatively invoked by the defendant. All other sixth amendment guarantees, including the right to a public and speedy trial, the right to be assisted
by counsel and the right of a defendant to be informed of the charges
against him, operate as a check upon the prosecutor regardless of
whether the defendant wishes to present a defense.1 82 The basic
reason behind adoption of the compulsory process clause was the belief that a defendant should be afforded the same opportunity to present his case as the prosecutor has to present his. 183 However, this

assisted by counsel. Id. at 593-96. The Court reasoned that the statute prevented the defendant's counsel from asking him questions about his unsworn statement in front of the jury. Id. It
appears that compulsory process would have been a far better rationale since that provision
logically includes the defendant's right to be a witness in his own defense. The flaw in the
Georgia statute was not that it denied the right to be assisted by counsel, since the defendant's
counsel was fully able to assist in the preparation of the statement. Rather, the statute abridged
the right of a defendant to present his evidence under oath, thus denying his unsworn testimony the weight given the sworn testimony of prosecution witnesses by the jury. See Westen,
supra note 161, at 108-09, 111. Of course, this reasoning does not account for the failure of
litigants to raise the issue.
178 78 N.J. at 274, 394 A.2d at 337.
179 See Westen, supra note 161, at 77. Madison originally drafted the compulsory process
clause to give defendants "the right to have a compulsory process .
(emphasis added). In
the final version the "a" was omitted. Id. at 98 n.115.
180 Id. at 77.
's
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
182 See Westen, supra note 161, at 74. The compulsory process clause also differs from other
constitutional provisions in that its meaning was intended to be a narrow one, rather than the
deliberately vague meanings connoted by use of a term, such as "due process" or "equal protection of the laws." Id. at 76-77.
183 For a thorough summary of the historical evolution of the doctrine of compulsory process
see Id. at 78-108.
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reasoning provided few clues as to the scope of compulsory pro84
cess. 1
The answer came nearly two centuries later in Washington v.
Texas 185 wherein the Court finally seized its opportunity to construe
the compulsory process clause. In its opinion, authored by Chief Justice Warren, the Court rejected a literal analysis of compulsory process 186 in favor of a more historical approach. 18 7 Thus, the Supreme
Court concluded that compulsory process included not only the right
to compel the attendance of witnesses but also the concomitant right

'84 Professor Westen characterized this issue as "[a]n important question, given the paucity of
debate regarding the substance of the right of compulsory process .... " Westen, supra note
161, at 98. In view of this, he pondered the importance of the precise wording of the compulsory process clause:
Is it significant that Madison chose words that, while guaranteeing the accused the
right to subpoena witnesses, do not specifically guarantee him the right to place
them under oath, or call them to the stand, or compel them to testify, and that do
not necessarily ensure him parity with the prosecution? Did Madison . . . intend to
guarantee only one aspect of the historic right to call witnesses, and leave the

Id.

others unprotected?
at 99.
185 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
185 See id. at 24-25 (Harlan, J., concurring). In his concurrence, Justice Harlan agreed that

the Texas statutes at issue were unconstitutional but did not join in the reasoning of the Court.
Rather, Justice Harlan argued that the issue presented in Washington was not one within the
scope of the compulsory process clause. Accordingly, he contended that the Court "strain[ed]"
the clause in its desire to invalidate the statutes. Id. at 24.
Similar criticisms of the Washington decision have been expressed. In one article, it was
asserted that the Supreme Court's holding in Washington was rendered almost "meaningless"
by its reliance on the compulsory process clause rather than the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. See Note, 20 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 470 (1968). The contention was that
by excepting nonarbitrary rules regarding disqualification of witnesses from the scope of the
Washington decision, the Court substantially weakened the impact of its holding. The logical
inconsistency of creating such a large exception to the rule could have been avoided had due
process principles been employed. Id. Moreover, the soundness of the Court's construction of
the compulsory process clause was questioned. Id. at 472. It was contended that compulsory
process confers no "substantive right" to have a witness's testimony placed into evidence, but
merely bestows upon a defendant a right to have defense witnesses subpoenaed to appear in
court. Id.
Another author commenting on the Washington decision argued that the Court had
"obscured the traditional distinction" between the right to compel the presence of witnesses and
the general rules regarding the competency of witnesses to give testimony. See Note, 46 TEXAS
L. REV. 795, 797 (1968). It was suggested that the Court "stretched the language of the sixth
amendment" in order to give the petitioner the relief that justice required and still comport
with the process of selective incorporation. It was noted that the petitioner would have been
denied relief under the selective incorporation doctrine since the right to be free from arbitrary
rules regarding the competency of witnesses, unlike compulsory process, is not one coinprehended by the Bill of Rights. Although this reason was postulated for the Court's reliance on
the compulsory process clause, it was admitted that this interpretation was of doubtful validit'.
Id. at 798-800.
187 388 U.S. at 23.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:333

to offer their testimony into evidence.' 8 8 Many commentators have
questioned the soundness of this interpretation and proposed instead
that the Court would have stood on firmer ground constitutionally by
employing a due process approach.' 8 9 Indeed, Justice Harlan in his
concurrence dismissed the Court's compulsory process analysis as a
"strain" on that constitutional provision and opted instead for invalidating the statutes on the ground that they abridged the right to a
fair trial generally.19 0 Despite these criticisms, the Washington decision has affirmatively settled the issue of whether a defendant has the
constitutional right under the compulsory process clause to present
the testimony of witnesses in his behalf. In light of that Court's own
limitation on its holding, 1 9 1 however, a question persists as to
whether or not the compulsory process clause may be invoked to
compel newsmen to disclose privileged information. This issue is
analogous to that involving other constitutional and statutory
privileges. Included among these are the privilege against self-

18 Id.

1'9 See note 186 supra. But see MacKenna v. Ellis, 280 F.2d 592, 604 (5th Cir. 1960), modified on rehearingen banc, 289 F.2d 928 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961).
190 388 U.S. at 24 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan also felt that the statutes discriminated against the petitioner in that they allowed co-defendants to testify for the state but
not for each other. Id. at 25 (Harlan, J., concurring).
191 See note 172 supra. It should be noted, however, that despite the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Washington and the long-awaited interpretation of the compulsory process
clause, there has not been much subsequent reliance on either the case or the clause. This is true
despite the presence of compulsory process issues. See, e.g., Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605 (1972). In Brooks, the Supreme Court invalidated a Tennessee statute which required that
any defendant who wished to testify in his own behalf at trial had to do so before an' other
defense witnesses were heard. The defendant in Brooks wished to testify at the close of the
defense's case but was prohibited from doing so because of the aforementioned statute. The
Court reasoned that this statute abridged the defendant's constitutional right to be assisted by
counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination. 406 U.S. at 612. Upon closer inspection,
however, the compulsory process clause would have provided a far better rationale for several
reasons. First, the Tennessee statute did not abridge the privilege against self-incrimination
since the defendant was not forced to speak when he wished to remain silent as is usually true
where the privilege against self-incrimination has been violated. On the contrary, he was forced
to remain silent when he wished to make a statement in his defense. Second, the right to
assistance of counsel was not implicated in Brooks since defendant was allowed the full assistance of counsel in presenting his case. What he lacked, however, was the right to assist himself, by taking the stand and testifying at the time he deemed most appropriate. See Westen,
supra, note 161, at 117-18. Third, a compulsory process analysis would have been more suitable there since the defendant's right to compel the testimony of witnesses in his behalf, logically
includes himself within that category. Indeed, the defendant is oftentimes the most persuasive
witness he has in his defense. To arbitrarily deny a defendant's otherwise competent testimony
because of the chronology of its presentation is clearly a denial of compulsory process. Id. at
119.
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incrimination, 192 the privilege of government informers,
19 5
lawyer-client privilege 194 and others.

19 3

the

In Roviaro v. United States,19 6 a defendant who was convicted of
possession of heroin sought disclosure of the identity of a government
informer who had played an active part in bringing about defendant's
possession of that substance and was present when the crime allegedly occurred. The government refused to reveal the informer's
identity claiming a privilege against such disclosure. The Supreme
Court held that "the fundamental requirements of fairness" necessitated that the informer's identity be revealed whenever it "is relevant
and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair
determination of a cause ....

",197

The Court believed that

employing a balancing test would be the most appropriate way of
ascertaining when the government privilege must yield to the "individual's right to prepare his defense." 198 Thus, the compulsory process clause was implicated in the Roviaro decision, when the Court
held that the defendant therein had the right to obtain the identity of
a witness who had essential knowledge of the crime. 199
A difficult situation may arise when a court is faced with a conflict between the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination

and the sixth amendment right to compulsory process. 20 0 While this
192
19'
194
195

See,
See,
See,
See,

e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,

Kastigar v. United States, 406
Roviaro v. United States, 353
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-20
State v. Roma, 140 N.J. Super.

U.S. 441 (1972).
U.S. 53 (1957).
(West 1976).
582, 357 A.2d 45 (Law Div. 1976). In that case,

a marriage counselor sought to quash subpoenas duces tecurn and ad testificandum served upon
him by the defendant and prosecutor in connection with a criminal proceeding. The defendant
was accused of the murders of his wife and infant son, and sought disclosure of the contents of
several marriage counseling sessions as an aid to his insanity defense. 140 N.J. Super. at 585,
357 A.2d at 47. The marriage counselor claimed a privilege of non-disclosure under the Practicing Marriage Counseling Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:8B-1 to -29 (West 1978). The court, after
recognizing that the defendant had a constitutional right under the compulsory process clause of
the sixth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth, held that the statutory
privilege must yield. 140 N.J. Super. at 587, 592, 357 A.2d at 48, 51. In this regard, the court
stated that "[w]hen . . . the exercise of a privilege . . . would compromise fundamental constitutional rights, judicial recognition of that privilege must be withheld." Id. at 592, 357 A.22d at 51.
196 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
197 Id. at 60-61. The Court further reasoned that a "fixed rule" with respect to the disclosure
of government infurmers was not warranted. Id. Instead, it advocated a balancing approach
based upon the pertinent facts of each particular case. Id. at 62.
198 Id. at 62.
199 Id. at 63-65. Cf McCrav v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 311 (1967) (government need not
disclose identity of informers whose testimony does not have bearing on question of defendants'
"guilt or innocence" but merely relates to side issues).
20 See, e.g., Holloway v. Wolff, 351 F. Supp. 1033 (D. Neb. 1972). Unable to resolve the
conflict between the two constitutional provisions, the court in Holloway decided that the
privilege against self-incrimination must take precedence over the right to compulsory process.
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situation is not one which lends itself to an easy resolution, an attempt has been made to circumvent the inherent unfairness which
results when one constitutional right is upheld and another sacrificed.
In such instances, grants of immunity from prosecution serve well to
protect both the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to
compulsory process. 20 1 In Kastigar v. United States, 20 2 a prosecution
witness challenged the government's right to compel his testimony
notwithstanding a grant of use immunity. 20 3 The witness contended
that use immunity was not coextensive with the privilege against selfincrimination. As a result, he claimed that forcing him to testify
under such a grant was a violation of his fifth amendment
privilege. 20 4 Essentially, the witness feared that the government
would use his compelled testimony against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The Court rejected these contentions holding that
use immunity was sufficient to supplant the privilege against selfincrimination. 20 5 That the decision in Kastigar relating to use immunity applies to compel the testimony of defense witnesses as well
as prosecution witnesses seems clear. 20 6 Indeed, the Court recognized that use immunity "leaves the witness and the prosecutorial
authorities in substantially the same position as if the witness had
207
claimed the Fifth Amendment privilege."
Other possible sources of conflict with the compulsory process
clause are statutory and private privileges. These include the
Thus, the court ruled that the defendant in that case could be tried without the beneficial
testimony
201 See,
202 406
203 Use

of a witness in his favor.
e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
U.S. 441 (1972).
immunity grants a witness immunity from the use of compelled testimony and any

evidence derived from that testimony. Transactional immunity, on the other hand, is broader
than use immunity in that the government would be barred from prosecuting that witness for
any offenses to which his compelled testimony related. See 406 U.S. at 443.
204 406 U.S. at 448.
205 Id. at 453.
206 One author has suggested that the government has a "constitutional obligation" to grant

use immunity to defense witnesses whose testimony might go unheard through invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination. In this regard, Professor Westen has stated that "[t]he government's interest in withholding use immunity is insufficient to outweigh the defendant's sixth
amendment interest in producing exculpatory testimony." Westen, supra note 161 at 167.

207 406 U.S. at 462. The grant of use immunity to defense witnesses does not put the government at a disadvantage since it is always free to prosecute the witness based on evidence

from other sources. As Professor Westen pointed out, the government is not yielding a superior
position by granting immunity since the witnesses' statements would never have been made,

had immunity not been granted. See Westen supra note 161, at 169. Additionally, at least one
court has indicated that it may be a denial of due process to grant immunity to prosecution
witnesses and withhold it from defense witnesses in the same case. See Earl v. United States,
361 F.2d 531, 534 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 921 (1967).
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lawyer-client, priest-penitent and newsman's privileges among several
others. These privileges have been grouped into three conceptual
categories -privileges
that can be constitutionally narrowed,
privileges that can be constitutitionally modified, and those that cannot be accommodated. 2 0
The newsman's privilege falls within the
third category since it is not one that can be limited or modified
without losing its essential purpose. 20 9 This was the precise situation
presented in Farber. While the court there opted for in camera disclosure of the privileged information, other courts may seek alternatives which are more protective of the newsman's privilege.2 10 One
such alternative is to require that the prosecution delete any portion
of its case which relies on the privileged information. 2 1 ' A more
drastic solution would be to dismiss the charges against any defendant
who can make a showing that the information sought "is indispensable
to rebuttal or to an affirmative defense .... " 212 Although such a
step may never be necessary in newsman's privilege cases, where in
camera inspection can be ordered, it is nonetheless a provisional rem-

208 See Westen, supra note 161, at 170-77. The first group includes those privileges which
must be balanced against the inhibiting effect they have on an accused's right to present a
defense. Accordingly, Professor Westen asserted that any privilege which impairs a defendant's
right to compel the testimony of witnesses in his behalf on inadequate grounds "is unconstitutional as applied" and must be narrowed. Id. at 171. The second category includes those
privileges wherein the communications involved bear more directly on the question of an individual's guilt or innocence. Thus, where a person has revealed sensitive information to his priest
or lawyer with the expectation that it will remain confidential under the lawyer-client or
priest-penitent privilege, it would seriously erode that expectation of confidentiality if the
lawyer or priest could be compelled to disclose such information to aid in another's defense.
Yet, the defendant should not be precluded from obtaining any exculpatory evidence. As previously indicated, this dilemma can be resolved to the satisfaction of both parties by the government's promise that the information, once disclosed, would never be used against the client or
penitent in a subsequent civil or criminal action. In such instances, the government would be
obligated to modify the private privilege to accommodate an accused's compulsory process
guarantee. The third category, however, includes those privileges which can neither be modified nor narrowed without totally or partially abrogating them. The newsman's privilege is
considered to be within this third category.
209 Westen, supra note 161, at 173.
210

See id. at 174.

211 This alternative would have been impractical in Farber since appellant Farber was in the

unique position of essentially being an arm of the prosecution.
212 Westen, supra note 161, at 174. While dismissal of the charges was the remedy in several
cases where the government had lost evidence pertinent to the defense, see, e.g., United States
v. Tsutagawa, 500 F.2d 420 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971), it is doubtful whether such a remedy would be widely employed in cases involving the
newsman's privilege. Indeed, Professor Westen recognized that the courts "can refrain from the
extreme step of dismissal" by resorting to in camera inspection of the privileged material. Westen, supra note 161, at 175. However, where the newsman refuses to produce the materials for
such inspection, as in Farber, dismissal may then be warranted.
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edy which should be employed where the newsman refuses to
comply with such an order to produce. Stated succinctly, "[d]ismissal
is simply an alternative means for satisfying the commands of compulsory process" 2 13 -a means which effectively accommodates both the
constitutional rights of a defendant and the statutory privilege of a
214
newsman.
In essence, then, from both conceptual and practical standpoints,
the court's decision in Farber may not have gone far enough. Conceptually, while the court reached the proper decision by holding
that the newsman's privilege must yield to the constitutional right of
Dr. Jascalevich to present a defense, it could have avoided the controversy surrounding the scope of the Washington decision and its
application to testimonial privileges by adopting a due process approach. Practically, the court should have effectuated the constitutional right of Dr. Jascalevich to present a defense-whether based
upon the sixth or fourteenth amendment-by dismissing the charges
against him.
Conclusion
The decision of the New Jersey supreme court in Farber did not
reflect the growing trend toward recognition of a qualified newsman's
privilege based upon the first amendment. Rather, the court relied
upon the strength of the New Jersey shield law to require that certain
procedural safeguards be implemented prior to permitting in camera
inspection of a reporter's confidential materials. While the ultimate
decision of the court is entirely reasonable given the paramount interest in preserving a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial, it appears that the refusal to recognize even a limited constitutional
privilege of nondisclosure resulted from too mechanical an application
of the Branzburg holding.
Yet it is not asserted that the result in Farber would have been
different had a balancing approach been employed. In all probability
the decision of the court would have been the same. However, by
basing its decision on the first amendment, the court could have provided the newsgathering function of the press with the constitutional
protection it deserves.
Susan P. McCarthy
213 Westen, supra note 161, at 177.

214 See, e.g.,Guest & Stanzler, supra note 1, at 50-51; Comment, supra note 1, 58 CALIF.
L. REV. at 1245-46.

